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Moralists, Reformers, and Narratives of
(Ir)responsibility at Administrative Fair Hearings
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Almost 40 years ago, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case Goldberg v. Kelly
(1970), provided welfare participants with a potentially potent tool for chal-
lenging the government welfare bureaucracy by requiring pre-termination
hearings before welfare benefits were discontinued or reduced. In 1996, with
the passage of the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA), the rights talk of Kelly was officially replaced with the dis-
course of individual responsibility. Using observational data of administrative
hearings and interviews with administrative law judges and appellants, this
study explores how fair hearings have been affected by this official reconcep-
tualization of rights. I find that hearings are not a panacea for challenging the
more punitive aspects of welfare reform, but nor are they devoid of the pos-
sibility of justice. While hearings can replicate in style and substance the in-
equities, rigid adherence to rules, and moral judgments that characterize
welfare relationships under the PRWORA, they can also be used as a mech-
anism for creating counternarratives to the dominant discourse about welfare.
This study identifies two types of judgesFmoralist judges and reformer
judgesFand examines how their differing approaches determine which nar-
rative emerges in the hearing room.
Almost 40 years ago, the Supreme Court, in the landmark
case Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), provided welfare participants with a
potentially potent tool for challenging the government welfare bu-
reaucracy. By requiring pre-termination hearings before welfare
benefits were discontinued or reduced, the Court gave recipients a
more meaningful opportunity to be heard and to participate in the
institutions of government. The Court also brought participants
into the fold of citizenship, framing welfare as a right, not a priv-
ilege, and proclaiming that ‘‘welfare, by meeting the basic demands
of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same
opportunities that are available to others to participate meaning-
fully in the life of the community’’ (Goldberg v. Kelly 1970:265).
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In 1996, with the passage of the Personal Responsibility Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), the rights talk of Kelly
was officially replaced with the discourse of individual responsibility.
Welfare was recast from a government obligation to a reciprocal ob-
ligation, to be dispensed only after the poorFthrough workFdem-
onstrated their responsibility. In a highly symbolic and meaningful
choice of words, the law also proclaims that the PRWORA ‘‘should
not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance’’
(PRWORA 1996: 42 USC 601(b); emphasis added). The obligation
remains, though, to provide recipients with an opportunity to be
heard in a state administrative or appeals process when their benefits
are reduced or denied (PRWORA 1996: 42 USC 602(a)(1)(B) (iii)).
Administrative hearings (commonly referred to as ‘‘fair hear-
ings’’) constitute a significant form of civil justice. As one example,
there were more than 130,000 requests for welfare hearings in
New York City in 2007, which is three times the number of small
claims court cases filed there yearly (New York State Office of
Temporary and Disability Assistance 2007:43; New York State
Unified Court System 2009). For many citizens, hearings are their
primary contact with legal systems. Because hearings are also wel-
fare participants’ only recourse for challenging government when
it denies them access to life-sustaining benefits, they are also ‘‘the
primary social justice system for poor people in the United States’’
(Brodoff 2008:132).
Few studies have focused on fair hearings or the use of legal
mechanisms to challenge the welfare system (see Sarat 1990; White
1990a). While several studies have investigated welfare partici-
pants’ interactions with state workers post–welfare reform (see for
example Gilliom 2001; Soss 2002; Lurie 2006), with the exception
of this author’s earlier study (Lens 2007, in press), none focus
specifically on the fair hearing system. Of interest is how fair hear-
ings have been affected by the official reconceptualization of wel-
fare from a right to a selective benefit premised on conformance to
specific social norms (Handler & Hasenfeld 2007; Adler 2008).
Through interviews with 59 welfare participants in an urban and
suburban area, I examined what motivates or inhibits them from
appealing adverse government decisions. I extend this research,
using ethnographic methods, including observational data of fair
hearings and interviews with administrative law judges and appel-
lants, to explore what happens when marginalized poor citizens
meet face-to-face with government officials to dispute their deci-
sions. This study also builds upon sociolegal scholarship that
explores citizens’, including poor citizens’, experiences with lower-
level justice systems, such as criminal district courts and small
claims courts, in the United States (Conley & O’Barr 1990; Merry
1990; Yngvesson 1993).
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I find that hearings are not a panacea for challenging the more
punitive aspects of welfare reform, but nor are they devoid of the
possibility of justice. I find that their use is more contingent and
contextual, shaped as much by the various actors in the hearing
room, and particularly the judge, as by the nature of the law and
the types of disputes bought before them. I find that certain judges,
whom I call moralist judges, act in ways similar to front-line work-
ers, as moral agents enforcing the new normative order of work
and responsibility. Other judges, whom I call reformer judges, play
a more traditional judicial role of protecting individual rights
against the power of the state by closely scrutinizing the agency’s
actions.
Theoretical and Historical Framework
Historically, citizens who received welfare, in contrast to other
government benefits such as Social Security, were treated as less
morally deserving. Aid to Dependent Children (the precursor to
Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families [TANF] under the PRWORA) was the
least generous of the New Deal programs. A two-tier system was
created where workers received social insurance benefits, and non-
workers, primarily women, received means-tested, and through
such devices as suitable home provisions, morality-tested, welfare
benefits (Abramovitz 1996; Handler & Hasenfeld 2007). It was not
until the 1960s, when a discourse of rights entered the public di-
alogue through the civil rights movement, that welfare, aided by its
own welfare rights movement, was reconceptualized from an act of
charity to a right of citizenship (Davis 1993; Kornbluh 2007). While
advocates fell short of creating a substantive right to welfare, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kelly recognizing welfare participants’
right to procedural due process installed welfare within the ambit
of rights (Bussiere 1997). The value of this right to participants was
evident. As one example, in 1969, the year before Kelly was de-
cided, in New York City only 1,300 welfare participants requested
hearings; in 1989 more than 150,000 hearings were requested,
even though the number of recipients had decreased (Perales
1990:891).
Fair hearings, though, occupy only some of the space within a
rights discourse. How citizens are treated on the front lines of a
government bureaucracy also implicates rights (Tyler 2006). Re-
spectful treatment and the ability to tell one’s story to an impartial
decision maker are essential components of due process when cit-
izens interact with government officials (Tyler 2006). The modern
welfare bureaucracy is consistently criticized as missing these
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ingredients on the front lines. Numerous studies document the
harsh and unwelcoming nature of welfare bureaucracies (Brodkin
1986; Bane & Ellwood 1994; Meyers et al. 1998; Sandfort et al.
1999; Hasenfeld 2000; Gais et al. 2001; Soss 2002; Riccucci et al.
2004; Lurie 2006). As Gilliom (2001) describes, surveillance and
control are the defining hallmarks of the front-line welfare rela-
tionship. As he elaborates, ‘‘[t]he participants are subject to forms
and degrees of scrutiny matched only by the likes of patients, pris-
oners, and soldiers’’ (2001:28).
In a similar vein, Hasenfeld (2000) describes the work of wel-
fare agencies as ‘‘moral work.’’ The primary goal is to ferret out the
deserving from the undeserving. In contrast to the more respectful
and personalized service provided to higher-status citizens in other
government agencies, welfare offices employs harsh service tech-
nologies grounded in suspicion and distrust (Hasenfeld 2000; Soss
2002). Front-line workers, acting as ‘‘empowered citizen agents,’’
apply the law in the context of the moral and social assumptions
underlying it, with workers reenacting these assumptions in indi-
vidual cases (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2003:24). Workers dis-
tinguish between good citizens and bad ones, dispensing benefits
based on ‘‘mainstream notions of moral worth and productive
membership in society’’ (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2003:94).
Fair hearings occupy a precarious perch within this system. As
the name itself signifies, fair hearings are the designated dispenser
of due process within the system. They exist to correct the excesses,
mistakes, and arbitrariness on the front lines. However, unlike
other legal institutions designed to insure justice, such as small
claims courts and district courts, they operate within the system
whose actions they are judging. In nearly half of all states, the
administrative law judges who preside over hearings are part of the
state welfare bureaucracy (Brodoff 2008).1 Thus, at many fair
hearings government not only provides the legal forum, but is the
opposing party as well.
Some contend that fair hearings are inherently flawed. White
argues that hearings contribute to the ‘‘hyper legalization of wel-
fare process’’ rather than unraveling it (1990b:868). Despite its
grounding in moral judgments, welfare law is highly rule-bound
and implemented through a web of rules and formulas that strip
away the human drama of need (White 1990b). To succeed in the
quasi-judicial forum of fair hearings, welfare participants must
translate stark need into ill-fitting bureaucratic and legal catego-
ries. The stigma of welfare imposes additional disadvantages. It
may prevent welfare participants from speaking with ‘‘confidence
1 In the other half of states, a separate and independent panel of judges is used
(Brodoff 2008).
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and credibility’’ (White 1990a:37). Their relationship to the wel-
fare bureaucracy is also ongoing; they may fear retaliation for what
they say in the hearing room (Handler 1986; White 1990a; Soss
2002).
More generally, quasi-judicial proceedings may be ill-suited to
welfare participants. Such groups are inherently disadvantaged
when participating in procedures shaped by dominant groups, es-
pecially in the formalized setting of legal adjudications (Handler
1986; White 1990a). As Conley and O’Barr (1990, 2005) found in
their study of small claims court, low-status social groups are less
versed in legal talk and more likely to use what they label relational
rather than rule-oriented accounts. Judges hearing a relational ac-
count must work harder; they must restructure the account to fit
the linear logic of the law, and decide which facts are relevant,
putting relational litigants at a disadvantage (Conley & O’Barr
1990).
Low-status groups such as welfare participants are especially
susceptible to a form of moralizing that occurs when the powerless
confront the powerful, and which undercuts their status as rights-
bearing citizens. As Yngvesson (1993) found in her study of lower
district courts where mostly poor people brought their complaints
against neighbors and others, the clerks who served as gatekeepers
reframed poor citizens’ complaints from a right to a moral tale,
thus ‘‘reproduce[ing] the dynamics of power from which com-
plaints emerge in the first place’’ (1993:57). Conley and O’Barr
(1990) uncovered the same phenomenon in their study of small
claims court, finding certain judges prone to making extra legal
and critical personal comments to poor litigants.
Nonetheless, legal forums are used, even by the marginalized
and disenfranchised, to create counternarratives, including a re-
conceptualization of rights. As Yngvesson (1993) also finds, while
official actors often replicate asymmetries of power by dismissing or
trivializing complaints, marginalized and excluded citizens use the
lower district courts creatively to subvert embedded hierarchies
of power, thus ‘‘negotiating and redefining normative order’’
(1993:8). White’s (1990a) recounting of ‘‘Mrs. G’s’’ fair hearing ex-
perience also demonstrates that resistance and confrontation is
possible. While the account emphasizes Mrs. G’s disadvantages in
the hearing room, it also illustrates the redemptive potential of
hearings. As White describes, Mrs. G. ignores her attorney’s advice
and pleads at her fair hearing for life’s necessities (a pair of Sunday
shoes) she was not entitled to under the law. White observes, ‘‘[h]er
statement was a demand for meaningful participation in the po-
litical conversations in which her needs are contested and defined’’
(1990a:49). Sarat (1990) notes similar moments of resistance
among the welfare recipients he observed accessing legal services.
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In short, resistance and subordination often exist side by side, with
the latter fertilizing the former.
How much fertilization has occurred since welfare reform, and
in particular within the fair hearing room, is unknown. As Munger
(1998) explains, ‘‘[p]overty law carries powerful messages about
the identities of the poor and the non poor, about responsibilities
for poverty, and whether the poor are to be treated with the same
respect as the nonpoor, as dependent persons, or as objects of
discipline’’ (1998:936). The PRWORA represents a shift in the
public’s conception of rights. Starting with the Social Security Act
(1935), through Kelly, and lasting until welfare reform, the state was
considered legally obligated to help the poor. This obligation,
though, was never elevated to the status of a constitutional right.
Nor despite attempts, most notably in the case of Dandridge v. Wil-
liams (1970), was poverty labeled a suspect classification, which
would have provided the poor with enhanced protection under the
equal protection clause.2
Instead, as the face of welfare began to change in the 1960s,
from the white widows of the past to increasingly minority families
and children born out of wedlock, welfare became less generous
and more demanding (Abramovitz 1996). As women’s participation
in the market economy increased (Blank & Schmidt 2001), the
work behaviors of poor mothers also came under increased scru-
tiny. Work requirements became steadily more onerous, and states
were encouraged under a federal waiver program to use more
coercive approaches including mandatory work, time limits, and
full-family sanctions to control the work behavior of the poor (Bane
& Ellwood 1994).
The PRWORA represents the culmination of these changes
and is reflective of a neoliberalism discourse that emphasizes free
and private markets and ‘‘personal rather than public responsibil-
ity for well being’’ (Smith 2005:216). Both Democrats and Repub-
licans joined together to eliminate the entitlement status of welfare,
giving official sanction to the proposition that the state has few
obligations toward its poor citizens. While the state still will provide
assistance, it is now the poor, and not the state, who are legally
obligated to behave in certain ways before being granted life-sus-
taining benefits, and even those benefits are temporary. Punish-
ments and conformance with work and other behavioral norms,
rather than aiding the most vulnerable, are the defining motifs of
2 Dandridge v. Williams (1970) involved a challenge to a state law that imposed a cap on
the amount of welfare assistance that a family could receive, thus treating large families
differently than smaller families who received increased aid when additional children were
born. The Court declined to treat poor families as a suspect classification, which would
have subjected state laws to the highest standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.
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the PRWORA (Little 1999; Handler & Hasenfeld 2007; Seccombe
2007).
How these differing conceptions of rights are manifesting in
the hearing room, a forum designed for the exercise of individual
citizen’s rights, is unknown. I examine this interplay between state
obligations and individual rights and responsibilities through the
disputes brought to the hearing room. I focus on cases, which I call
‘‘eligibility cases,’’ where appellants have allegedly not provided
sufficient documentation to prove their eligibility, or have violated
a condition of eligibility, such as compliance with work rules. These
cases involve discretionary and subjective judgments regarding el-
igibility for public assistance. They invoke narratives of fault and
responsibility; were the appellants acting irresponsibly when not
providing documents or failing to attend a work appointment? Or
was the agency acting improperly by failing to provide needy cit-
izens with aid?
Methodology
This study uses ethnographic methods, including observations
of administrative hearings, informal and formal interviews with
administrative law judges, interviews with appellants, and a review
of the laws and regulations governing hearings. The observations
were conducted in a suburban county located outside a major city
in the Northeast during 2007 and 2008. The county is the most
populous county in the state, outside of this city, and has the fourth
largest population of welfare recipients in the state.3
I conducted all the hearing observations and observed all the
judges (seven) who were assigned to the unit at the time. During
the hearings I maintained a detailed log, recording both what was
said (as much as I was able to as I listened to the case) and other
observations as follows: physical descriptions of the parties and the
environment of the room; obvious states of emotions (e.g., anger,
crying, laughter); the parties’ demeanor, tone, and style (e.g., au-
thoritarian, conciliatory, antagonistic); level of formality (e.g., how
strictly or loosely procedural rules on evidence and testimony were
followed); and quality of personal interactions (e.g., friendly, hos-
tile, apathetic). I also recorded routine and standardized data for
each hearing observation (e.g., parties present, issue at hearing,
length of hearing).
I did not use any formal selection process when deciding which
cases to hear. On those days when there was a single calendar, I
3 To protect the anonymity of the judges and the hearing unit, all references that
would allow the reader to identify the state have not been included, but they are on file
with the author.
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observed cases in the order in which they were heard. On those
days when there were two calendars, and hence two judges hearing
cases, I chose hearings based on which appellant appeared first and
was ready to proceed. I also observed hearings during two differ-
ent times of the year, summer and winter. I observed 70 cases in
total; of these 53 were full cases on the merits, and the rest were
adjournments or withdrawals. The shortest case took 10 minutes to
complete, the longest two hours. The average time was 30 minutes.
In between hearings I talked informally with the judges and to
a lesser extent the agency representatives. I was unable to take
notes during these informal conversations but wrote notes after-
ward while still in the field and during gaps in observations. I
transferred field jottings and observations into full field notes im-
mediately after actual observations and used in-process memos to
‘‘identify and develop analytical themes’’ (Emerson et al. 1995:
100).
I also conducted formal in-depth interviews with six of the
seven judges whose cases I observed, using a semi-structured in-
terview guide consisting of open-ended questions about their ap-
proach to conducting hearings, their perception of participants
and the hearing process, and their decisionmaking process.4 I also
asked several general questions about their attitude toward the
welfare system and the role of government in this sphere. The
interviews lasted between one and two-and-a-half hours. Since I
was not granted permission to tape-record these interviews, I took
notes only. To insure the accuracy of my notes, I sent each judge
my composed notes and requested that they check them for ac-
curacy. All six judges responded to this request and provided me
with corrections and edits of my notes of our interview.
A small number of appellants were also interviewed by tele-
phone after their hearings. I had originally intended to interview
as many appellants as possible. I collected the names and phone
numbers of 33 appellants; of these nine were interviewed. As is
common in this population of primarily low-income individuals,
phone numbers were often disconnected and/or phone calls were
not returned. Although the sample size is small, it is representative
of the range of cases observed and includes at least one case from
five out of the seven judges observed. While I did not choose the
appellants randomly, I used no systematic bias to select them. I
used these interviews as supplementary data to my primary data
source, the observation of hearings.
A research assistant conducted the interviews using a semi-
structured interview guide consisting of open-ended questions
4 The one judge I did not interview was assigned only sporadically to the fair hearing
unit and lived too far away for a personal interview.
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about the interviewees’ reason for appealing and their experience
at their hearing, including their perceptions of the judge and
agency representative, how they were treated, and their perceived
ability to present their case. They were also asked several general
questions about their attitudes toward the welfare system and the
role of government in this sphere. The interviews lasted from one
half-hour to one hour and were tape-recorded and transcribed.
My unit of analysis is the case, or the hearing that I observed.
The focus is on the conversations and interactions that took place
in the hearing room, and not the outcome of the hearing (i.e., who
won or lost), or the soundness of the appellant’s or agency’s legal
position. Rather, I focus on how the appellant’s case was presented,
discussed and shaped by the parties through the course of the
hearing. I use my informal conversations with the judges (which
were sometimes but not always about the individual cases I ob-
served), and the subsequent interviews with the appellants, to con-
firm my observations and to further explore the parties’
perceptions and experiences of the hearing process.
I used grounded theory conventions for data analysis and be-
gan by conducting line-by-line coding, attaching descriptive codes
to lines of data (Charmaz 2006). Next I conducted focused coding,
which involved identifying the most significant and/or frequent
line-by-line codes and choosing codes that best categorized the sa-
lient dimensions of the emerging themes and patterns (Charmaz
2006). Coding was an iterative process, and I returned to earlier
coded transcripts or field notes to confirm, refute, or modify codes
as they developed. I used analytical memos throughout the pro-
cess, first to define and describe various codes and then to conduct
theoretical coding, which is a way of rebuilding coded data and
establishing a conceptual framework by exploring the relationships
between categories and subcategories (Charmaz 2006).
To develop my categories of reformer judges and moralist
judges, I used, among others, the following codes: moral worth,
whenever the judge made a statement or suggestion that implicitly
or explicitly referred to issues of moral worth; scrutinizing, when a
judge challenged the agency’s version of events; and joining, which
encompassed the various and shifting alliances among the parties
during hearings.
Findings
Fair hearings in this state sit atop a multilayered welfare bu-
reaucracy. Local counties administer welfare benefits, determining
eligibility and dispensing aid. The state department of social
services supervises the provision of aid through the issuance of
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regulations and administrative directives that interpret and explain
social service laws. Unless and until a recipient appeals a county
decision to deny, terminate, or reduce aid the state has no juris-
diction over individual cases. Hearings are conducted by the state,
and the office of hearings and appeals is located within the state
welfare bureaucracy.
The needs-based benefit determinations that can be appealed
include financial aid and services (such as TANF), medical assis-
tance (including Medicaid and state health insurance programs),
and food stamps. Of the 70 cases I observed, 37 involved financial
assistance, 28 involved medical assistance, and three involved food
stamps.5 Because of the variety of programs, including state health
insurance programs with higher income caps than TANF, appel-
lants ranged from the very poor, including long-term recipients of
public assistance, to others with steady employment whose only
need was for health benefits or support services, such as day care.
However, even these distinctions are fluid, as crises such as divorce,
ill health, and unemployment cause formerly middle-class persons
to apply for TANF. Almost two-thirds of the appellants were fe-
male; specifically, there were 23 male appellants and 41 female
appellants. Twenty-three of the appellants were black, 10 were La-
tino, and 29 were white.6
For many appellants, appealing serves both instrumental and
expressive purposes (Lens 2007, in press). It provides a chance for
individual redress as well as a platform for protesting perceived
unfair treatment. Appellants, in contrast to non-appealers who are
often as equally frustrated with the system, have more faith in
the system and their ability to engage with it. In short, ‘‘they chose
agitation over apathy’’ (Lens in press: n.p.). However, like
their non-appealing counterparts, they are suspicious of the state
welfare bureaucracy’s ability to provide a fair and impartial forum.
As described next, the physical location of hearings within the
welfare center and the lack of judicial trappings contribute to this
wariness.
The Place and Space of Hearings
Hearings within the county are centralized and are held in one
of the local county welfare centers. Three people typically attend
hearings. There is the appellant (and sometimes, but rarely, his or
her attorney), who triggers the process by appealing an agency
5 The numbers do not sum to 70, the number of cases heard, because in two of the
adjourned cases the program was not indicated.
6 Numbers do not sum to 70 because in some cases the appellants did not appear on
their behalf and/or their sex or ethnicity could not be determined from the record.
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decision to deny, terminate, or reduce aid.7 There is the decision
maker, an administrative law judge appointed by the state welfare
bureaucracy to hear the dispute, make findings of fact and law, and
recommend a decision to the commissioner of the state social ser-
vice department. The judges are all lawyers, but their backgrounds
are diverse. Some are long-time state government employees; oth-
ers have worked in legal services or district attorney offices. The
agency is represented by county workers specially designated as
fair hearing representatives and who only handle appeals. They
are not attorneys; most have previously worked as caseworkers in
the county welfare office.
In the legal world, appeals usually signify a higher authority,
both literally and figuratively. For example, one talks of the court
‘‘below.’’ Courts look and feel different than other business and
social spaces. Entranceways and reception areas, and the court-
room itself, often possess a certain grandeur. The trappings of jus-
ticeFthe elevated bench and black-robed judgesFsymbolize
power and status, but also the singularity of the law and the
unique way in which participants interact in such a space (Stimson
1986).
There is little inkling of this at fair hearings. In the county
welfare building where hearings are held, appellants sit in the
lobby alongside other welfare participants conducting their every-
day business. There is little to distinguish why they are there. They
could just as easily be filing an application for assistance as to be
appealing its denial.
Similar to judicial calendars, all appellants are given one of two
timesF9:00 or 1:00Ffor their hearings. The wait is unpredictable
and, depending on how long each hearing takes, can be short or
very long. In a courtroom this ordering of time serves both in-
strumental and expressive purposes. While inefficient for those
waiting, it is very efficient for the court and signals its elevated and
special status. But a ritual that elsewhere might signal the unique-
ness of what is to occur here invites the opposite conclusion. The
wait is no different than any other day at the welfare center where
participants are not given specific appointments but queue up for
assistance.
The architecture of the hearing room further downplays the
significance of what is to come. The hearing rooms are located in
the back of a large space, divided into cubicles, where the daily
business of the welfare center takes place. Appellants must pass by
7 Of the 70 cases I observed, 11 involved an attorney, and in three the appellant was
accompanied by a nonlegal advocate, such as a social worker. Appellants are rarely rep-
resented by an attorney because of the lack of legal services available for welfare recipients
(Brodoff 2008).
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these cubicles to get to the hearing rooms, which, unlike the cu-
bicles, are enclosed rooms. As one appellant succinctly described it,
‘‘They took me into a back room,’’ aptly if unintentionally distin-
guishing it from traditional courtrooms, which are at the center of
activities.
The hearing rooms are ordinary and have few of the trappings
of a courtroom. There is a desk at the head of the room where the
judge sits, with a computer and phone on the desk. A table extends
from the front of the desk, with chairs on each side. The table,
chairs, and desk are ordinary mass-produced government furni-
ture. The only embellishments, requested by the judges to give the
room a more judicial aura, are two flags on a stand, the state flag
and the flag of the United States. The room has none of the gran-
deur or solemnity of a courtroom. There is no sign of the som-
berness or dignity usually associated with the law and judicial
spaces. The feeling is bland and ephemeral; any type of office work
can occur in this room. Children, seldom seen in a courtroom, are
often present.
The only nod to the power and authority of the respective
players is the layout, with the judge sitting at the head of the desk
while agency representatives and appellants sit across from one
another, as is fitting for adversaries. The judges are not robed but
wear business clothes; some wear suits, while others wear less for-
mal, business casual clothes. The agency representatives also vary
in their attire; some dress up and others dress down. Appellants
dress the most informally; they usually come attired in street
clothes, pants and sweatshirts or T-shirts, windbreakers left on,
caps affixed. This lack of a de facto dress code is emblematic of the
hearing room’s informality. Appellants do not dress up for their
hearings and enter an official space that does not suggest they
should. No matter their garb they do not appear out of place.
The space between the parties around the table is close enough
for ordinary conversation. It is a social distance where speech can
be informal and nonverbal expressions easily discernible. No one
needs to stand and approach the judge as in a courtroom, where
the distance between the parties requires more formal language
and body stance and more exaggerated gestures (Stimson 1986).
While this informality may be less intimidating for appellants,
along with the bland furniture and lack of judicial symbols and
artifacts, it dilutes the expectation that a different type of decision-
making is occurring.
As Stimson (1986) observes, architecture ‘‘embodies and im-
poses a sense of social order and social structure, and both en-
courages and limits social relationships’’ (1986:652). From the
physical space it inhabits, to the way in which the parties dress and
initially interact, the hearing room replicates the social order and
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social structure of the local welfare office. There is little difference
between the hearing room and the government offices where the
initial transaction, now a subject of appeal, took place. Conse-
quently, some appellants are unsure of where they are. They do
not understand that the judge is from the state, that the state is
different from the county, and that the judge and agency repre-
sentative are not on the same side. It is left to the judge, sitting at
an ordinary desk in a room located within the welfare center, to
create the aura of a different and judicial space.
Narratives of (Ir)responsibility
Eligibility cases involve two separate categories of cases. The
first involve alleged violations of the work rules, where the agency
reduced or denied aid because the appellant allegedly failed to
attend a work appointment, a requirement of eligibility.8 The sec-
ond type of case, which I call document cases, involves the doc-
umenting of eligibility, with the agency denying or discontinuing
aid because the appellant allegedly failed to submit required paper-
work, attend a recertification appointment, or otherwise prove
eligibility. Both these types of eligibility cases often involve com-
plex findings of fact, credibility determinations, and subjective
assessments.
The predominant narrative clashFcommon to all dispute nar-
rativesFis who is at fault. Welfare law, as described above, gives
ample room for focusing scrutiny on appellants’ actions and be-
haviors. Underlying many of the rules, and especially the work
rules, are assumptions about the participant’s lack of responsibility
and ability to conform to social norms. On the other hand, welfare
bureaucracies also elicit suspicion, as do bureaucracies in general,
as they are prone to red tape and mistakes. Designed as adversarial
proceedings, hearings potentially provide a place for these com-
peting narratives to be examined equally.
I find that which narrative emerges is largely determined by
the judge, and that two types of judges emerge: moralist judges
and reformer judges. Moralist judges inject a sense of disappro-
bation and personal judgment in their hearings through both the
8 In accordance with federal and state law, recipients of public assistance in the subject
county are required to engage in such work activities as attending assessment appoint-
ments, searching for a job, or working in subsidized or unsubsidized employment or work
experience programs. Failure to comply with the work rules results in the imposition of a
sanction, which is a pro rata reduction of the violator’s portion of the grant. Hearings on
work sanctions typically involve subjective determinations as to whether an appellant is too
disabled to comply with the work rules or had ‘‘good cause’’ for not attending a work
appointment, for example because of illness or a family emergency. Eighteen of the 70
cases I observed involved work sanctions.
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questions they ask and the framing of issues. They are more apt to
elicit and emphasize narratives of personal irresponsibility from
the appellants. They focus on the wrongness and rightness of the
appellant’s actions, rather than the agency’s. By contrast, reformer
judges avoid, at least explicitly, the moral undertones of welfare
reform, focusing on the facts rather than on personal and moral
judgments. They take a more skeptical approach, scrutinizing the
agency’s actions closely. I examine these shifting narratives
through first the work sanction cases and then the document cases.
The Work Sanction Cases
Work sanction disputes elicit a powerful and enduring social
narrative, that of the irresponsible and personally defective welfare
recipient. This narrative draws on larger societal assumptions
about the participants, who are among the most stereotyped and
stigmatized of social groups. According to this narrative many if not
most welfare recipients, many of whom are single mothers and
minorities, are incompetent and incapable in the spheres of work
and family and must be prodded into self-sufficiency (Mead 1997;
Rector & Youseff 1999).
Work sanction hearings are thus the most susceptible to the
moral judgments about the poor’s work and personal behaviors
embodied in PRWORA. In one illustrative case, a young woman
who was sanctioned claimed a fire in her apartment prevented her
from working. The judge commented on the woman’s use of
agency-issued transportation tokens for work appointments to
move her belongings to her father’s house. She told her, ‘‘You used
the tokens for personal things. It was obviously not important for
you to go to [the Department of Labor].’’ A woman who missed a
work appointment was told by the judge, ‘‘You have to toe the
line.’’ Another man, also appealing a work sanction and who
claimed he left his worksite because ‘‘he was bleeding from his
rectum’’ was told by the judge, ‘‘People with medical problems
work. It doesn’t make them abandon their work.’’
As the last case demonstrates, work sanction hearings also serve
as a venue for contesting competing definitions of able-bodied. In
the past, the disabled were viewed as more morally deserving of
government help than the nondisabled. Under welfare reform,
disability and deservingness are not synonymous, and many of the
disabled are expected to work. Those claiming illness or disease or
other work obstacles are often viewed as being able to work, but
evading it. Failing to overcome obstacles presented by ill health or
disease is sometimes portrayed as a moral failing.
An illustrative case involves a 43-year-old black woman, living
in an emergency shelter and suffering from both shingles and
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AIDS, who was sanctioned for failing to attend an appointment at
the Department of Labor. At the hearing, she claimed that the
morning of her appointment she awoke feeling ill but walked to
the local church to use their phone to find out which bus to take to
her appointment. According to her, the available bus took much
longer than expected and that when she called the Department of
Labor to say she would be 20 minutes late for her appointment she
was told it was too late and was sanctioned. At the hearing the
agency criticized her for calling for bus information at 10:00 for a
1:30 appointment because ‘‘it’s very easy she might not make it.’’
The agency told her, ‘‘You set yourself up, you know you’re ill, but
[there are] times when [you’re feeling] good, times when [you’re
feeling] bad. If [it was] so bad you should have rescheduled the
appointment rather than setting yourself up.’’
Work sanction cases can also revolve around narratives of
agency irresponsibility. For example, appellants may allege that the
agency made an error in processing the sanction or made it diffi-
cult for them to comply with the work rules. In one example in-
volving a 37-year-old black man who failed to attend a drug
assessment appointment, the judge focused on the agency’s failure
to provide him with sufficient tokens to get back and forth to the
appointment.
Which narrative dominates largely depends on the judge. I
next explore in detail, through two contrasting cases, how the two
types of judges, moralist and reformers, elicit dissimilar narratives.
The first case, ‘‘Everyone Works,’’ involves a moralist judge, and
the second, ‘‘Already Working,’’ involves a reformer judge.
Case #1: Everyone Works
This case involved a 42-year-old white man who was challeng-
ing the agency’s determination that he was employable and had to
comply with the work rules. The agency went first, testifying that
he was assessed and had various ailments, including Graves’ dis-
ease and psychiatric and drug problems, but that his doctors in-
dicated he could work. They relied on, among other things, a
physician-completed standardized employability form that typically
provides minimal medical information and uses check-offs to in-
dicate the appellant’s ability to stand, walk, and so forth. This form
indicated that the appellant could walk or stand for one to two
hours a day and that he could work part-time with limitations.
The appellant came to the hearing with additional information,
including more detailed medical reports, and claimed that the cu-
mulative effect of his ailments prevented him from working. Ac-
cording to him, his Graves’ disease was not under control and was
being treated with iodine. He also explained that he had hepatitis
but could not be treated for it until the Graves’ disease was under
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control. He also had ‘‘stroke-level high blood pressure’’ and
suffered from depression, which had also not been treated yet. He
noted that in the past the agency found him unemployable and that
his medical condition had not changed but had worsened. He also
referred to a head injury, explaining that ‘‘his head was split open’’
and that he had problems with memory. In short, he constructed a
story of disability.9
In response to the additional medical evidence, the judge said,
‘‘It’s not relevant, what’s relevant is whether or not you could
work.’’ The agency echoed the judge: ‘‘It’s not relevant, people
with diseases work.’’ The judge then mirrored the agency: ‘‘The
issue is employability, not what disease you have.’’ Both the agency
and the judge rejected the medical evaluation submitted by the
appellant, preferring to rely on the standardized form. The judge
explained, ‘‘I’m not a doctor, I can’t make a diagnosis.’’ The agency
likewise explained, ‘‘I am not a medical doctor, neither is the
Commissioner. That is why we give you forms to give to the doc-
tors.’’
They argued over the form, which said he could only walk or
stand one to two hours at a time; the judge interpreted this to mean
he could work: ‘‘Many jobs are mostly sitting.’’ The appellant ar-
gued that it meant he was severely limited. The judge told him,
‘‘Public assistance is not for people who can’t work’’; the agency
told him that ‘‘people with wheelchairs work.’’
The judge distilled the sum of the appellant’s many medical
ailments to the short, succinct, and bureaucratically approved em-
ployability form. Evidence that amplified or explained it was fil-
tered out by the judge or agency, who ‘‘are not doctors’’ and ‘‘don’t
make diagnoses.’’ This rigid application of the rulesFwhere the
only relevant evidence was the formFcontrasted sharply with the
judge’s and agency’s wide-ranging and negative personal judg-
ments of the appellant’s willingness to work. Here they universal-
ized their arguments and strayed outside the law, arguing that
everyone worksFeven people with wheelchairs work. Judge and
agency joined together to advance their common narrative. The
judge restated the agency’s argument, and vice versa. The agency
spoke for the judge: ‘‘I am not a medical doctor. Neither is the
Commissioner,’’ thus emphasizing their commonality.
Case #2: Already Working
This case, presided over by a reformer judge, involved a work
sanction for failing to attend an assessment appointment. The
9 Under the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI), individuals who are dis-
abled may be entitled to benefits; however, this is a separate and distinct program not at
issue here.
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agency presented its case, stating that the appellant, a 25-year-old
Latina woman, told the agency she was working the overnight
shift at Pathmark (a supermarket) the day of her assessment. The
agency contacted Pathmark and was told the appellant had
quit without notice several weeks before. The agency argued
that even if she was working at Pathmark she still could have at-
tended her appointment that day. The agency depicted the appel-
lant as untruthful, claiming she was working when she was not,
and that in any event she had no excuse for not attending her
appointment.
As soon as the agency stopped speaking, the appellant said, ‘‘I
don’t understand the documents. I got the gist of it . . . [but not all
of it].’’ The judge responded by telling her, ‘‘I want you to under-
stand all of it.’’ He restated the agency’s case and then walked her
through all the documents the agency submitted. He also extracted
from the agency’s file additional evidence favorable to the appel-
lant but not mentioned by the agency, indicating that she was
working at Pathmark, including overnight shifts, and had submit-
ted pay stubs to the agency.
The judge then elicited the appellant’s side of the story, asking
her, ‘‘Did you go to your assessment?’’ After she submitted a doc-
ument from Pathmark indicating that she had worked the night
shift the day of her appointment, the judge noted to the agency
that the appellant’s proof ‘‘flew in the face’’ of the agency’s asser-
tion that she quit Pathmark without notice. The agency then pur-
sued another tack, first asking the appellant when she obtained the
evidence from Pathmark and then asking her when Pathmark
posted work schedules. (The latter question was meant to suggest
that the appellant made the assessment appointment even though
she knew she was working.) The judge asked the agency, ‘‘Now is
that relevant?’’ and blocked this line of questioning. The hearing
was adjourned so that the agency could consider settling the case in
the appellant’s favor.
The judge used several devices to level the playing field and
direct the narrative arc of the hearing. He monitored the appel-
lant’s level of understanding, restating the agency’s presentation
not as fact but to make it more understandable and allow her to
respond. After the agency presented its case he asked the appel-
lant, ‘‘Did you go to your assessment?’’ rather than ‘‘Why didn’t
you go to your assessment?’’ thus giving her a clean slate to tell her
story without assuming malfeasance. Instead of presenting a united
front with the agency as the judge did in ‘‘Everyone Works,’’ he
signaled his distance, first by scrutinizing the agency’s proof and
then by openly disagreeing with the agency. Finally, there was no
hint of disapproval of the appellant’s character or work habits, only
a focus on the facts.
Lens 579
The Document Cases
One of the most enduring narratives about government bu-
reaucracies is that of dysfunction, encapsulated in the words or
phrases typically used to describe them: ‘‘mired in red tape,’’
‘‘Byzantine,’’ or ‘‘Kafkaesque.’’ Welfare bureaucracies in particular
have been criticized as prone to bureaucratic disentitlement, or the
denial of aid to otherwise eligible people based on processing er-
rors (Lipsky 1984; Brodkin 1986). Consistent with this, cases in-
volving the documentation of eligibility elicit numerous complaints
from appellants, including that the agency fails to return phone
calls, loses their documents, or otherwise makes mistakes. The
agency’s position is the mirror opposite; it typically claims the ap-
pellant is neglectful and uncooperative.
Even these seemingly straightforward paper-processing cases
can elicit, similar to the work sanction cases, morally tinged nar-
ratives on both sides. Appellants sometimes use hearings to com-
plain not just about the benefit denied, but also how they are
treated by front-line workers. An example is a woman applying for
welfare for the first time at age 50 who began with a prepared
statement detailing how poorly she was treated by workers: ‘‘What
I didn’t get is being treated like a human being . . . I requested this
hearing because of the way my claim was handled . . . I was treated
unprofessionally and disrespectfully . . . like a number.’’ The agency,
for its part, often depicts appellants as irresponsible and unable to
follow through on straightforward requests for documents.
As with the work sanction cases, and illustrated next by ‘‘The
Missing Documents’’ case, moralist judges focus on the appellant’s
shortcomings. By contrast, in the ‘‘Lost Day Care Payments’’ de-
scribed afterward, reformer judges are more apt to challenge the
agency.
Case 3: The Missing Documents
This case involves a 45-year-old white mentally impaired
woman who had been receiving Medicaid for many years. She re-
quested a hearing when her Medicaid was discontinued for failure
to provide certain documents. The hearing was presided over by
the ‘‘Everyone Works’’ judge. The appellant was accompanied by a
social worker from a local agency that assists severely mentally dis-
abled individuals. The agency presented its case, explaining that
the appellant was discontinued because she failed to submit re-
quested documents regarding her income and where she was liv-
ing. The agency noted that a one-week extension was given when
the appellant called for an extension to submit the documents.
When the documents were not received, the worker sent the ap-
pellant a standard letter required by the regulations requesting
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them again and offering assistance if she was having trouble se-
curing the documents. The letter was returned as undeliverable.
The agency’s narrative thus depicted the agency as reaching out to
assist an uncooperative client who was given several chances to
comply.
In response to the agency’s presentation, the appellant ex-
plained that she moved and that her former landlord was not for-
warding her mail. The judge responded by telling her ‘‘it was not a
question of mail’’ and that she had ‘‘numerous opportunities to get
the documents.’’ The judge then asked her, ‘‘Why did you ignore
the agency?’’ The appellant explained that she fell and that she had
a death in the family, and had requested additional time, but the
worker denied it, telling her, ‘‘We don’t care if you had a death.’’
She thus constructed herself as a victim beset by problems and the
agency as unhelpful and uncaring.
The judge did not ask the appellant any follow-up questions
about the death or her accident, or her conversations with the
agency. Nor did she ask the agency about these events. Rather, she
asked the appellant, ‘‘What did you do? You had a responsibility. You
decided to do nothing.’’ The judge’s focus on the appellant’s failings
silenced her, and the appellant said, ‘‘I don’t have much to say.’’ She
resorted to pleading need, stating, ‘‘I have no money.’’ The judge
concluded the hearing by saying, ‘‘What do you want? What are you
fighting? You come here with no documents. The agency has a right
to ask you for documents. It’s not your place not to decide [to give it
to them]. Why would you want a fair hearing?’’ The appellant briefly
and hesitantly tried to place the focus back on the agency: ‘‘I have
had Medicaid for a long time, they know I need it.’’ The judge
suggested she withdraw her fair hearing request and reapply, not-
ing, ‘‘The agency did not do anything wrong . . . [you] made a willful
decision not to bring documents and still don’t have it.’’
The appellant, whose timidity increased as the hearing pro-
gresses, only hinted at possible agency malfeasance (they don’t care
if you had a death; they know I need [Medicaid]). Despite the
presence of a social worker for the disabled (who sat silently after
identifying herself), the appellant’s mental impairment was not
part of the narrative, even though it was known to all. The judge
also framed the agency’s demands in legal termsFthey had a
‘‘right’’ to the documentsFwhile judging the appellant in personal
terms. This impeded scrutiny of the agency’s actions. There was
little distinction between the judge and the agency representative;
both blame the appellant.
Case 4: The Lost Day Care Payments
This case, presided over by the reformer judge in ‘‘Already
Working,’’ involved a discontinuance of day care payments, also for
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failure to submit required documents. As the hearing began, the
appellant, a young white woman in her thirties, immediately seized
control, stating succinctly and forcefully, ‘‘Here’s the deal. I am
missing two months’ day care.’’ Without being interrupted by the
judge, she gave a detailed account of the agency’s mistakes, in-
cluding a lack of notice of the termination of day care. She also
included legally irrelevant but personally compelling details about
her life, including that she was the sole breadwinner in her family
because her husband had a disabling brain tumor. She ended her
presentation with a clear and strong statement of the remedy she
was seeking: $2,000 reimbursement for the day care bill paid with
her credit card and approval of her day care going forward, al-
though the latter issue was not before the judge.
After she presented her case the judge, adopting the narrative
of agency dysfunction, asked the agency if it had any record of why
it did not produce a notice. He suggested an adjournment so that
the agency could resolve the matter (in the appellant’s favor). The
appellant, concerned that an adjournment would delay a resolu-
tion, repeated her presentation. After embellishing on her hus-
band’s disability, she noted that for nine years she received notices
from the agency and that this time she did not. The agency in-
terjected that it ‘‘hadn’t presented their case yet.’’ The appellant
and judge ignored this statement. The appellant explained that she
‘‘can’t wait any longer. I waited six weeks for this hearing.’’ She also
admitted, ‘‘Life is a bit chaotic. My husband can misplace the mail
[due to his brain tumor].’’ She pled hardship, explaining that
without day care she would have to take her 10-year-old son, who
suffered from attention-deficit disorder, to work with her.
The appellant combined her narrative of agency dysfunction
with a compelling narrative of vulnerability and need. Her slight
admission of faultFthat her life was ‘‘chaotic’’ and the mail may
have been misplacedFwas drowned out by the dramatic circum-
stances surrounding it: a husband with a brain tumor who could
not support the family, a son with problems. The judge responded
by telling the agency, ‘‘At this point she has made a compelling
case.’’ He also told the agency, ‘‘Not that I dispute your word. But
this young lady needs proof from the agency’’ (that her day care
had been approved). The agency left the room to secure the proof
(in the form of a letter from the agency), and returned with the
same letter the appellant received earlier indicating that she would
be approved for day care upon receipt of additional paperwork.
Both the judge and the appellant explained to the agency that she
needed a final, not conditional, approval letter. The judge asked
the agency to check with the appellant’s worker that they had
received all the necessary documents, and if so, to provide
an approval letter that day, with a second letter providing
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reimbursement for the past payments. The hearing ended with the
agency agreeing to do so.
In contrast to ‘‘The Missing Documents,’’ it was the agency, not
the appellant, who was immediately put on the defensive. The
judge struck a friendly and non-intimidating tone toward the ap-
pellant while treating the agency with skepticism. Instead of si-
lencing the appellant at the beginning of the hearing when she
spoke out of turn, the judge allowed her to present her case against
the agency and to repeat it several times, accompanied by com-
pelling personal pleas. He adopted her narrative and never gave
the agency an opportunity to formally present its case. Instead it
emerged in bits and pieces through his questioning. The judge’s
questions contained explicit assumptions as to fault; for example,
he asked the agency why it did not provide a notice to the appel-
lant, not whether it issued a notice. The judge also joined with the
appellant and helped her make her case, noting that she ‘‘made a
compelling case.’’ The judge also went beyond the issue before him
(reimbursement for past day care expenditures), securing for the
appellant a crucial bureaucratic document establishing her present
eligibility.
Moral Agents or Agents of Reform?
As the preceding cases illustrate, the judge largely determines
whether a discourse of agency failure or individual moral failure
dominates. Consequently, similar cases can result in different nar-
ratives. ‘‘The Missing Documents’’ and ‘‘The Lost Day Care Pay-
ments’’ both involved sympathetic appellants: one a woman with a
severe mental disability, the other a woman struggling to support
her family after her husband became severely disabled with a brain
tumor. Both involved appellants found eligible for services over
many years, but whose present application was missing required
documents. Both also involved possible bureaucratic malfeasance.
Yet in the case presided over by the moralist judge, that malfeasance
remained unexplored. Under the reformer judge, it predominated.
The reformer judge solved the problem and restored benefits; the
moralist judge sent the appellant back to the agency to reapply.
Similarly, the work sanction cases were handled differently by
the two types of judges. The moralist judge focused on the appel-
lant’s work behavior, suggesting that he was able to work despite
his impairments, while defending the agency’s actions. The re-
former judge focused on factual discrepancies in the record rather
than work behaviors and the sufficiency of the agency’s case against
the appellant.
The judges differed in other ways; for example, some judges
were more formal, and judges varied in how actively they engaged
Lens 583
with the parties.10 These cases, though, represent the two con-
trasting styles of judging within the hearing room that most
affected which narratives emerged. For purposes of illustration I
chose the two judges and cases that provided the most contrast
between the two styles, with each of the other judges falling on a
continuum from moralist to reformer. As described next, each style
had its own distinctive characteristics, with different consequences
for the appellants.
Moralist judges are more likely to form alliances with the
agency and are less skeptical of it. They usually follow the agency’s
lead, leaning heavily on the agency’s version as the benchmark. As
one judge with this approach explained, ‘‘It’s [the agency presen-
tation] very helpful because then you are not groping blindly.’’
Another explained, ‘‘It’s important to keep the [procedural] order
. . . If the appellant went first I would get a very confused account.’’
Moralist judges are more likely to focus on the appellant’s failure to
follow bureaucratic rules, such as deadlines for submitting docu-
ments or reporting rules for work appointments.
By contrast, the reformer judges are more vigorous fact-find-
ers. They are less likely than moralist judges to join with the
agency, describing their relationship with them as ‘‘rough’’ or as a
‘‘test of wills.’’ Consequently, they are less likely to accept the offi-
cial version of the case and more likely to scrutinize it. As the judge
who presided over ‘‘The Lost Day Care Payments’’ and ‘‘Already
Working’’ explained, he liked ‘‘holding the agency’s feet to the
fire’’ and believed in a ‘‘level playing field’’ where the agency has to
prove its case. While reformer judges also scrutinize the appellant’s
case, they are more alert to possible agency malfeasance. Such
judges do not hesitate to correct the agency; in fact, some seem to
relish pointing out its errors, from minor to major. As one judge
put it, he enjoyed ‘‘having the opportunity to stop the agency from
rolling over people who can’t defend themselves.’’
Moralist and reformer judges also differ in how they perceive
their role. Moralist judges narrowly define their role. As ‘‘The
Missing Documents’’ and ‘‘Everyone Works’’ judge explained, ‘‘I
consider myself as an enforcer of the law, not a mediator . . . . Our
job is not to resolve complaints; we are fact finders, enforcers of the
law. It’s a legal process not agency conflict resolution.’’ She stressed
the need to maintain control over often-unruly and confused ap-
pellants: ‘‘I don’t want it to be a free-for-all but professional. I keep
it professional because otherwise it is a set-up to brawl and people
may attack the agency representative. In more formal courts, it’s
10 It should be noted that the small sample size limited a deeper exploration of how
other characteristics, such as gender, age, ethnicity, or experience, may have affected ju-
dicial styles.
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more well-behaved, like a church. Our clientele are on the edge.’’
Another judge with a similar approach explained, ‘‘It’s one rolling
cloud of things they are talking about,’’ thus requiring her to ‘‘be a
little strict when I need to focus on clients.’’ To keep appellants in
line, such judges sometimes use legal threats, such as adjourning
the hearing if a disruptive appellant does not calm down.
By contrast, reformers describe their role more broadly. They
often act as mediators between the parties, and sometimes even as
advocates for the appellant when they think the agency’s actions
warrant it. As one reformer judge put it, ‘‘I’m not a social worker but
the job lends itself to that. I spend a little more time doing social work
efforts I don’t have to do. I cut through the mess and help someone
. . . . I make them feel comfortable and fix the situation.’’ In contrast
to ‘‘The Missing Documents’’ and ‘‘Everyone Works’’ judge, who was
not there to do ‘‘conflict resolution,’’ this judge actively encouraged
the agency to settle cases (by withdrawing adverse notices) and was
proud of her reputation for doing so. As she explained, ‘‘The judge
usually has to be the one to advocate for that.’’
The reformers also neutralize the drama and tension that
characterize welfare interactions, avoiding, at least explicitly, mak-
ing moral judgments about appellants. They are often protective of
appellants, warning them, for example, not to make statements the
agency might use against them. They strive, as one judge put it, to
‘‘ease the appellant’s anxiety.’’ As another judge with a similar ap-
proach explained, ‘‘I put myself in their place . . . . I want to make
sure the appellant is relaxed and understands they will be heard. I
try to keep it simple. I don’t like to talk over them . . . . I consider it
a success if the appellant says they couldn’t sleep the night before
worrying about the hearing but that it turned out OK.’’ When
responding to irate appellants, rather than relying on legal threats,
reformers employ such psychological devices as speaking slowly
and calmly and allowing the appellant to ‘‘vent.’’
These differing approaches have different consequences for
the role hearings play within the welfare bureaucracy and how
appellants experience hearings. Reformers, because of their will-
ingness to settle conflicts and not just decide them, convert hear-
ings into a negotiating tool for resolving disputes. Because they are
more likely than moralists to scrutinize the agency and assist ap-
pellants, they minimize the power imbalance between the agency
representative, who has a superior knowledge of the law and access
to bureaucratic files, and the appellant, who is often uneducated
and often unprepared.11 Such appellants feel heard in the hearing
room; as one such appellant reported about a hearing with the
11 In 2006, 41.5 percent of TANF recipients had less than a high school education
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2006: n.p.).
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judge who presided over ‘‘The Lost Day Care Payments’’ and ‘‘Al-
ready Working,’’ ‘‘The judge was fair, because he allowed me to
talkFat times, when she [the agency representative] would not
allow me to talk, the judge says ‘No, I want to hear his side. I want
to hear what he has to say.’ And that was important to me because
that’s all I needed, was just to be heard.’’ Another appellant echoed
this description: ‘‘When I didn’t understand he would explain it to
me. When the other woman (the agency representative) . . . was
trying to cut me off . . . he would tell her ‘well, she’s showing proof
to you . . .’ so he helped me out a lot.’’
Appellants also perceive such judges as impartial despite their
being situated within the welfare bureaucracy. As noted above, many
appellants view the judges as extensions of the agency. Because they
are government officials working for the same bureaucracy the ap-
pellants are challenging, judges must work harder than judges in
more independent settings to establish their impartiality. Reformers
are able to communicate this. As one appellant explained, ‘‘I kind of
expected them to really be three against me, or looking at me like a
monster.’’ He thought that while overall the judges ‘‘lean toward the
system,’’ his judge ‘‘wanted it to be fair for both sides.’’
By contrast, appellants before moralist judges reported much
greater dissatisfaction with hearings. They felt both unheard and
personally attacked. They described feeling ‘‘chastised’’ and made
to feel ‘‘stupid.’’ They experienced their questioning as ‘‘badger-
ing,’’ ‘‘grilling,’’ or ‘‘aggressive talk’’ and claimed their ‘‘words were
twisted.’’ They believed they were not given enough time to pres-
ent their case; as one appellant described her experience, the judge
‘‘was very black and white . . . it was very bing, bang, boom, next.’’
Another appellant was more explicit, commenting to herself after
she left a hearing with ‘‘The Missing Documents’’ and ‘‘Everyone
Works’’ judge: ‘‘The judge was a nasty bitch. She didn’t give me a
chance to talk.’’
Such appellants are more likely to blur the identities of the
agency and the judge and are unconvinced of the latter’s impartial-
ity. As one appellant described his experience with one such judge:
‘‘I basically knew I was done as soon as it began . . . I started
trying to present what I had, my pills and everything and you
know she [the agency representative] started laughing at me. And
I thought that was real inappropriate. And the judge just kind of
went along with it. And to tell you the truth that was real em-
barrassing. . . . I wasn’t sure what to do . . . I felt like I was being
downgraded.
Another said, ‘‘It was like I was being blackballed immediately.’’
From the appellants’ perspective, hearings became a site for
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their surveillance, replicating their powerlessness rather than ad-
dressing it.
Discussion and Implications
Administrative hearings have been variously described as
places of powerlessness for participants or as havens for protect-
ing their rights. This study depicts a more complex and fluid fo-
rum that can function as a social space for enforcing normative
values or for challenging them. Part government office and part
judicial space, hearings can replicate the worst of the welfare bu-
reaucracy but can also function as intended, as a check on agency
arbitrariness or power. Both the purpose of hearings and the par-
ties’ social identities shift as orientations, alliances, and issues co-
alesce in the hearing room. The existence of both reformer and
moralist judges suggests that legal decisionmaking within such ad-
ministrative spaces is fluid, with judges wielding their power in
very different ways.
Welfare law is embedded with assumptions about how people
become poor and dependent on welfare. These assumptions include
the belief that poor people behave irresponsibly and have poor at-
titudes toward work, and hence require behavioral incentives and
sanctions in order to become self-sufficient (Munger 2002). The el-
igibility cases are fertile ground for enforcing these assumptions.
The obligation of poor citizens to prove they are worthy of benefits
finds their expression in these cases, where appellants’ work habits
and sense of responsibility are dissected. This is what occurred in
‘‘Everyone Works,’’ where the judge depicted the appellant as a
malingerer. Likewise, in ‘‘The Missing Documents,’’ the judge trans-
formed a common and prosaic dispute over the processing of doc-
uments in large bureaucracies into a morality tale where the
appellant ‘‘willfully’’ decided not to provide documents.
Hearings presided over by moralist judges thus reproduce in
style and substance the moral judgments that characterize welfare
law and welfare interactions. Hearing rooms resembles the front
lines, where ‘‘empowered citizen agents’’ dispense benefits based,
in part, on who is a good or bad person (Maynard-Moody & Mus-
heno 2003). Arguably, this is what the PRWORA, with its emphasis
on personal responsibility over individual rights, requires. Moralist
judges, by emphasizing the appellant’s behavior and not the
agency’s, give meaning and effect to the law’s elimination of welfare
as an entitlement. They also enforce the normative judgments
contained in the law of who is deserving of aid.
The Supreme Court in Kelly (1970), however, promised some-
thing different: to provide the powerless poor with an effective
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mechanism for challenging the government welfare bureaucracy. The
Court chose as its mechanism due process adversarial-style adjudi-
cations presided over by an impartial judge, and where the appellants
have an opportunity to present their case orally. By silencing or re-
directing appellants’ counternarratives and replicating the inequities,
rigid adherence to rules, and moral judgments that characterize
front-line interactions, moralist judges block the ability of the partic-
ipants to use hearings to challenge both the large and small of welfare
law. Appellants cannot use hearings to challenge welfare law’s dom-
inant discourse as applied to all or as applied to them individually on
the front lines. In this way, moralist judges fail to fulfill Kelly’s promise.
Moralist judges also impart another lesson: that it can be risky to
engage the formal legal mechanisms of government to challenge its
perceived mistakes. Appealing to the state can further marginalize
poor citizens rather than empower them as judges and lawyers in-
terject their own interpretations of what is occurring (Merry 1990;
Cowan 2004). Cowan (2004) observed this dynamic when applicants
applying for homeless benefits in the United Kingdom engaged
lawyers to argue their case with the bureaucracy. Because the dispute
was no longer defined by them, ‘‘the attempt to gain power through
law caused feelings of powerlessness’’ (Cowan 2004:945). Similarly,
Bumiller (1987) has found that many victims of sexual discrimina-
tion avoid formal forums because of a fear of being victimized again.
Likewise, hearings presided over by moralist judges may leave
appellants worse off for having challenged the bureaucracy. They
reproduce and exacerbate the stigma and powerlessness of the front
lines as the dispute is transformed from one against the state to one
that implicates poor citizens’ own moral and personal failings.
Whether their accounts are accurate or not, appellants do not per-
ceive moralist judges to be impartial, or willing to listen to them. As
Tyler (2006) observes, procedural due process is as important, and
perhaps more important, than substantive justice. Even an unfavor-
able hearing decision ‘‘can preserve the integrity of the decision
making process’’ (Super 2005:1068) if appellants believe they are
treated respectfully and are able to fully tell their story. A fair fair
hearing can dispel notions that government officials act arbitrarily or
irrationally or make decisions based on personal judgments, and it
can convince appellants that both the agency and the judge are
acting fairly and correctly (Super 2005). Because hearings presided
over by moralist judges are perceived by appellants as missing the
basic ingredients of a fair process, such hearings can degrade the
relationship between citizens and their government.
In contrast to moralist judges, reformer judges play a more
traditional judicial role, following the facts rather than focusing on
the appellant’s behavior. They are more likely than moralist judges
to scrutinize the agency. Their inherent suspicion toward the
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agency can, however, result in the appearance of bias. For example,
in ‘‘The Lost Day Care Payments,’’ the reformer judge immedi-
ately adopted the appellant’s narrative and gives the agency little
room to present its version. The truncating of the agency’s testi-
mony, the implicitly biased questions, and the joining of the judge
with one of the parties echoed, in part, the moralist judge’s style in
‘‘The Missing Documents.’’ However, because the hearing was not
laced with authoritative personal judgments and was aimed at the
more powerful of the two litigants (the agency), the consequences
were different. While such judges risk abdicating their neutrality
and hence harming the adjudicative process, they also level the
playing field in a way moralist judges do not.
The existence of reformer judges also challenges past percep-
tions of fair hearings, and the welfare system they are a part of, as
monolithic bureaucracies weighed down by legal rules and regu-
larly wielding power in ways that disadvantage the poor (Handler
1986; White 1990a). The findings suggest that this result is not
inevitable and that hearings are not an inherently flawed instru-
ment ill-suited to disadvantaged citizens. The reformer judges,
despite being part of the welfare bureaucracy and despite their
social distance from the poor, invite and construct narratives that
challenge the dominant discourse of both the welfare bureaucracy
and society, which views welfare recipients as socially deficient and
personally irresponsible. They are also willing to use their power to
push back against the welfare bureaucracy they are a part of. This
is what occurred in ‘‘The Lost Day Care Payments,’’ where the
tables were turned on the agency and its power undercut by an
assertive and critical judge and appellant. In ‘‘Already Working,’’
this same reformer judge helped the appellant challenge the
agency’s depiction of her as falling short of her work obligations.
As Silbey observes, law is ‘‘constituted both by domination and
resistance, consensus and conflict’’ (2005:341). Several scholars
have documented the ways in which the disempowered look for
those few spaces within the law where resistance is possible (Merry
1990; Sarat 1990; White 1990a; Yngvesson 1993; Cowan 2004).
This study suggests that such spaces are flexible and fluid enough
to be populated by official actors doing the same and who use their
power not to dominate, but to expand the crevices where con-
frontation and resistance are possible.
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